In The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets, John Mayberry attacks the 2000-year-old problem of accounting for the foundations of mathematics. His account comes in three interrelated parts: determining exactly what one should (and should not) expect from a foundation; arguing that set theory can in fact provide such a foundation, and presenting a novel version of set theory (or at least a novel exposition of traditional set theory) which can fulfil this foundational role.
In The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets, John Mayberry attacks the 2000-year-old problem of accounting for the foundations of mathematics. His account comes in three interrelated parts: determining exactly what one should (and should not) expect from a foundation; arguing that set theory can in fact provide such a foundation, and presenting a novel version of set theory (or at least a novel exposition of traditional set theory) which can fulfil this foundational role.
He addresses the first of these issues (in Chapters 1 and 6) by arguing that the most important aspect of mathematics is the axiomatic method, and thus a foundation for mathematics must provide a justification of this method (but need provide little more). Axiom systems, according to Mayberry, isolate particular mathematical structures (or are meant to), and all that is left for a foundation to supply is a guarantee that some appropriate structure exists that satisfies the axioms:
For when we employ the axiomatic method, the only special subject matter that we need acknowledge as belonging to mathematics is that of sets [. . .] . All that was required, historically, to replace the traditional methods completely was to lay down three axiomatic theories [analysis, arithmetic, and geometry] [. . .] and then to show how [these theories] could be reconstructed by straightforward algebraic and set-theoretical methods applied to models of those theories. (p. 204) informal theory consisting of self-evident truths that can provide the subject matter of axiomatic mathematics and thus supply the necessary foundation.
Once one knows what one is looking for, one can proceed to the second and third issues: providing a foundation which satisfies the desiderata outlined above (this issue is addressed in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7). Mayberry argues that set theory, properly conceived, can provide such a foundation. The set theory in question is an informal collection of axioms justified by the intuitive notion of finite, understood: 'in the essential and original sense of ''finite'', the non-technical sense, viz. ''limited (or definite or bounded) in size '' ' (p. 47) . This non-standard (at least to contemporary ears) usage of 'finite' can be confusing to a reader who is less careful than he should be, although Mayberry is quite conscientious about reminding the reader that 'finite' does not, as it is used in the book, mean Dedekind-finite. For the remainder of this review, I will place 'finite' in scare quotes when using it as Mayberry does to mean bounded or limited, distinguishing it from more traditional (non-quoted) use of the word.
For the ancient Greeks, 'finite' coincided (at least intuitively) with the modern notion of Dedekind-finite, and the set-theoretical revolution at the turn of the century stemmed from:
Cantor's key doctrine [. . .] that a plurality may be of the same size as certain of its proper subpluralities and nevertheless remain finite [. . .] . In effect he rejected the classical notion of finiteness, the notion employed by both Aristotle and Euclid. (p. 47) Thus, the history of set theory is described as the process of amending what collections, or pluralities, are to count as 'finite'. This rational reconstruction of the history of set theory as the evolution of the notion of 'finite' is one of the most interesting and useful parts of the early sections of the text.
Mayberry presents informal analogues of most of the standard axioms (e.g. powerset, union, empty set, pairing, replacement, etc.) which he claims are justified by this intuitive notion of 'finitude'. He points out that one gets an informal version of something like Cantorian-(or Zermelo-) style set theory as long as one accepts the axiom of infinity, i.e. the claim that the collection of natural numbers is 'finite' in the relevant sense.
Mayberry points out that the ancient Greeks conceived of numbers not as unique referents of numerals, but as 'finite' pluralities that are instances of a general species, asking us to:
consider the idea of number that our modern idea of 'natural' number has supplanted, the classical Greek concept of arithmos. On that conception, a number (arithmos) is a finite plurality (multitude, multiplicity) composed of units, where a unit is whatever counts (!) as one thing in the number under consideration. (p. 21) As a result, the proper way to analyse number talk is along the lines of 'The number of horses in the field is a five,' and not 'The number of horses in the field is five' (pp. 24-5). Mayberry repeatedly emphasises that, on his view, the apparent grammar of number talk fooled Frege and the rest of us, but not the ancient Greeks, into thinking that there is a unique object that is the referent of 'five'. If numbers are pluralities, then the theory of natural numbers is just the theory of finite (in the modern sense) pluralities. Mayberry, however, stresses the other side of this explanatory coin. If 'finite' (in the classical or Cantorian sense) pluralities are numbers, then this informal set theory is really just a form of number (or cardinality) theory, allowing him to claim in the preface that:
All of mathematics is rooted in arithmetic, for the central concept in mathematics is the concept of a plurality limited, or bounded, or determinate, or definite-in short, finite-in size, the ancient concept of number (arithmos). (p. xix)
The essential difference, on Mayberry's approach, between modern-day Cantorian set theory and the so-called Euclidean account of number is that Cantor extended the notion of 'finite' to include Dedekind-infinite pluralities, i.e. infinite numbers as 'finite' pluralities.
In order to justify the axioms, Mayberry argues that 'finite' pluralities composed of physical objects, although not physical objects themselves, are nevertheless no more problematic than the objects that make them up (and, more generally, that the existence of any plurality is no more problematic than the existence of the objects composing it, whether these components are physical objects, other pluralities, or whatever):
Is a number of horses, say a five, a physical object then? No, it is a number, a five, of physical objects. Numbers are sui generis; but then so is every other basic kind of thing: things are said to be in many ways. (p. 35) Apparently, pluralities are just given to us: there is something that is a five (a plurality consisting of five objects) over and above the five objects that somehow compose it, but our knowledge of this plurality is no more mysterious than our knowledge of the objects. This insistence on the 'givenness' of pluralities is meant to deal with many of the traditional philosophical worries about mathematical objects:
Simply by being objects, and therefore, by hypothesis, having, severally, claim to real, independent existence, and by being, conjointly, finite in multitude, the units of an arithmos together and collectively constitute a single well-defined thing, viz., an object. (p. 73) It is in this discussion of set theory and ancient arithmetic that we find the only significant flaw in the book, although it is a sin of omission, not commission. One would expect a book arguing that (at least some) sets (conceived of as pluralities) are composed of physical objects to contain a discussion of, e.g., Penelope Maddy's Realism in Mathematics ([1990] ). Similarly, one would expect a position that argues that (in some sense) numbers are sets (since sets are numbers, i.e. pluralities) to demonstrate how the view in question handles the points made in Paul Benacerraf's now classic 'What Numbers Could Not Be' ([1965] ). Neither 'Maddy' nor 'Benacerraf' occurs anywhere in the text, however.
These oversights are not as inexcusable as they first appear, however. Mayberry intends to provide us with a foundation for mathematics, in the sense of 'foundation' that was in vogue half a century ago, not to settle philosophical questions regarding epistemology and truth which are more in fashion today. In fact, Mayberry explicitly argues that, when explicating the foundations of mathematics, one should avoid such philosophical complications (Sections 1.3 and 3.7). As a result, the reader should approach the early sections of the book not as a well-developed philosophy of mathematics, but as an informal sketch of Mayberry's philosophical views serving as a backdrop to his main project-providing mathematical foundations. With this in mind, perhaps we should judge the book by the quality of the later, mathematical content. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Mayberry is correct in avoiding epistemology and related philosophical matters, some readers are likely to find themselves wondering how the material contained in the early sections of the book connects to contemporary philosophical work on the nature of sets.
Fortunately, it is Mayberry's third task, presenting his new set theory, that is perhaps the best part of the book, as he seems more comfortable in a purely mathematical environment. As noted above, the axioms of Mayberry's informal set theory rely on an informal notion of 'finite' or unbounded, and the revolutionary leap to the transfinite occurred when Cantor allowed Dedekind infinite structures into the realm of the 'finite'. Mayberry, however, has doubts about the legitimacy of this conceptual leap:
there is evidence that something may be amiss in Cantor's paradise, evidence that it may, in fact, harbour a serpent. This evidence comes from two sources-from mathematics itself and from physics. It is not decisive, but must be disturbing to a Cantorian. (p. 264) The worries to which he refers are (1) the independence of the continuum hypothesis, and (2) the fact that the theory of relativity and quantum theory eliminate the need for infinite extension and infinite divisibility in nature, respectively.
As a result of these worries, Mayberry concludes the text (Chapters 8 through 12) by investigating what happens when we replace the liberal Cantorian conception of 'finite' with the original, ancient Greek restriction. In other words, he investigates what follows from the standard set theoretic axioms (or his informal analogues) when we replace the axiom of infinity with:
The Axiom of Euclidean Finiteness: (8f Þð8Y Þðð f : Y ! Y^f is 1-to-1) !f is onto) (p. 277; reformulated slightly) This axiom is meant to capture Euclid's Common Notion 5: The whole is greater than the [proper] part. The consequences of this Euclidean set theory are investigated, and a wealth of significant results emerge, some of them quite surprising. One of the most interesting of these is that:
The Euclidean theory of simply infinite systems, unlike its Cantorian counterpart, forces us to acknowledge the existence of natural number systems of different lengths. (p. 382; emphasis added) This result, and others like it, shed a great deal of light on the role of the (traditional) axiom of infinity in set theory. In addition, the new theory of sets promises to be of interest to mathematicians and philosophers of a constructivist bent. Nevertheless, Mayberry admits that much work remains:
We do not yet know enough about how mathematics can be developed in Euclidean set theory to make an informed choice between that theory and Cantorian orthodoxy. But I believe that the prospects of developing mathematics in that [i.e. Euclidean] way are promising, and indeed, exciting. (p. 387) He concludes the text with a lengthy list of unresolved issues and open problems within Euclidean set theory.
Mayberry's treatment of set theory will be of interest to anyone working in the foundations of mathematics, especially those interested in the different conceptions underlying our acceptance of set theoretic axioms. The parts of the text concerning the axiomatic method and the role of foundations are excellent, as Mayberry's discussion is well informed regarding the workings of actual mathematical practice. In addition, the later sections describing Euclidean set-theory stand out both for the clarity of the mathematics and the novelty of the view of set-theory being presented. Finally, even if some philosophically important issues are side-stepped in favour of mathematical concerns, the mathematical work here promises to be a significant contribution to our understanding of notions such as finiteness, boundedness, and definiteness, and of mathematics as a whole.
